House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party Announces Critical Minerals Policy Working Group

On June 18, 2024, the Chairman of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the US and the Chinese Communist Party (the “Select Committee”), John Moolenaar (R-MI), and Ranking Member of the Select Committee, Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL), announced the formation of a Critical Minerals Policy Working Group (the “Group”) focused on countering the Chinese Communist Party’s (the “CCP”) “control of critical mineral supply chains.” Emphasizing the importance of this supply chain, the announcement notes that “[c]ritical minerals are used in everything from semiconductors and wind turbines, to electric vehicles.” The Group will be led by Representatives Rob Wittman (R-VA) and Kathy Castor (D-FL). Representatives Blaine Luetkemeyer (R-MO), Haley Stevens (D-MI), Carlos Gimenez (R-FL), Ritchie Torres (D-NY), and Ben Cline (R-VA) will also serve on the Group.
The Group is charged with “producing legislation and spreading awareness through Committee events to counter the CCP’s dominance of critical minerals,” creating “transparency into US supply chain dependency for critical minerals,” and “develop[ing] a package of proposed investments, regulatory reforms, and tax incentives to reduce that dependency.” The announcement explains that the Group also will build on the Committee’s December report, entitled, Reset, Prevent, Build: A Strategy to Win America’s Economic Competition with the Chinese Communist Party (the “Report”), which set out “a strategy to fundamentally reset the United States’ economic and technological competition with the People’s Republic of China, and draw attention to American reliance on Chinese critical materials.”
Relevant highlights from the Report include:

• The Select Committee adopted nearly 150 policy recommendations for Congress to legislate pursuant to three pillars: (i) resetting the terms of the US economic relationship with the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), (ii) preventing the flow of US capital and technology fueling the PRC’s military modernization and alleged human rights abuses, and (iii) building technological leadership and collective economic resilience in concert with US allies.   
• Issuance of key findings regarding critical minerals, noting America should “enhance US trade and technology collaboration with its allies and partners while decreasing dependence on the PRC in critical supply chains” and the US “is dangerously dependent on the PRC for critical mineral imports.”
• In light of these findings, a recommendation that Congress should “[e]nact legislation to encourage sectoral agreements with key trading partners and allies with strong rules of origin and high standards on critical minerals . . .” and “[e]nsure that critical minerals needed for national security purposes are sourced domestically and from friendly countries through diversified and secure supply chains.” The Report notes several Congressional actions needed to achieve these goals, which include increasing recycling for batteries and certain end-of-life products, expanding trade agreements with allies and partners for critical minerals that are unavailable in the US, researching deep sea mining, directing the International Development Finance Corporation to prioritize critical mineral transactions, and mandating the Export-Import Bank of the US “to accept greater loan-loss risk across its portfolio and expand its transformational export areas to include” critical minerals.

Interested parties in critical mineral supply chains should continue to monitor the Group’s announcements and corresponding measures, especially given that both the United States and China view critical minerals as an area of strategic importance and a matter of national security.