House Passes Multiple Bills Targeting Threats Posed by the Chinese Communist Party
- Jennifer L. Parry,
- 张婧,
- Warren S. Payne,
- Emily King
The US House of Representatives held a “China Week” in September. The week focused on passing 25 bills designed “to protect Americans against the military, economic, ideological, and technological threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party [CCP].”1 The bills, many of which received bipartisan support, covered a range of topics, including biotechnology companies, telecommunications and information supply chains, and US export controls and sanctions. While the bills have passed the House, they are still pending before the Senate.
In its statement recounting the week, the Select Committee on the CCP highlighted the passage of five China-related bills: (1) the BIOSECURE Act, (2) the Countering CCP Drones Act, (3) the Decoupling from Foreign and Adversarial Battery Dependance Act, (4) the Countering the PRC Malign Influence Fund Authorization Act of 2023, and (5) the Science and Technology Agreement Enhanced Congressional Notification Act of 2023.
THE FIVE BILLS HIGHLIGHTED
The BIOSECURE Act
The BIOSECURE Act passed the House by a vote of 306–81. The bill seeks “to protect Americans’ genetic data and U.S. firms from predatory CCP-backed biotechnology companies.”2 More specifically, it prohibits federal agencies from “obligat[ing] or expend[ing] loan or grant funds,” and recipients of federal funds from using such funds, to “procure, obtain, or use any biotechnology equipment or services produced or provided by a biotechnology company of concern” (“Prohibited Biotechnology Equipment or Services”) or from contracting with any entities that do so. It also prohibits federal agencies from “enter[ing] into . . . or extend[ing] or renew[ing] a contract with any entity that” 1) uses Prohibited Biotechnology Equipment or Services or 2) “enters into any contract the performance of which such entity knows or has reason to believe will require, in performance of the contract with the executive agency, the use of” Prohibited Biotechnology Equipment or Services.
A “biotechnology company of concern” is defined as 1) one of five entities positively identified in the bill and 2) any entity that is determined by the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Attorney General; the Director of National Intelligence; the National Cyber Director; and the Secretaries of Health and Human Services, Commerce, Homeland Security, and State to be3:
- “[S]ubject to the administrative governance structure, direction, control, or operates on behalf of the government of a foreign adversary” (i.e., China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia);
- Involved “to any extent . . . in the manufacturing, distribution, provision, or procurement of a biotechnology equipment or service”; and
- Posing a risk to US national security based on the entity’s 1) involvement in certain foreign-adversary-supported or -affiliated research; 2) providing the government of a foreign adversary with multiomic data (data types that include genomics, epigenomics, transcriptomics, proteomics, and metabolomics) “obtained via biotechnology equipment or services”; or 3) “obtaining human multiomic data via the biotechnology equipment or services without express and informed consent[.]”
To avoid disruption to existing commercial arrangements, the bill provides a five-year unwinding period for contracts and agreements entered into before the Act’s effective date. Entities designated as a biotechnology company of concern will have 90 days from listing to submit information and arguments opposing the designation.
The Counter CCP Drones Act
The House passed the Countering CCP Drones Act by voice vote. The bill addresses concerns surrounding the presence of Chinese drones in US infrastructure; specifically, it amends the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) Covered List by adding “telecommunications or video surveillance equipment” produced by and “telecommunication or video surveillance services, including software, provided by” one Chinese company in particular. The covered list identifies communications equipment and services that the FCC has determined pose an unacceptable risk to US national security.
The Decoupling from Foreign and Adversarial Battery Dependance Act
The House passed the Decoupling from Foreign and Adversarial Battery Dependance Act by voice vote. The Act targets the presence of forced labor in battery supply chains by prohibiting the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from procuring batteries from (i) Chinese entities specified in section (b) of the Act; (ii) entities identified on the Department of Defense’s Section 1260H List, the 15 C.F.R. § 744 Entity List, and any list required under the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA); and (iii) any subsidiary or successor to an entity described in (i) or (ii). The Act also provides that DHS may waive the prohibition if certain strict conditions are met and must notify Congress of the waiver no later than 15 days after granting it. If passed into law, the prohibition would begin on October 1, 2027.
The Countering the PRC Malign Influence Fund Authorization Act of 2023
The House passed the Countering the PRC Malign Influence Fund Authorization Act of 2023 by a vote of 351–36. The bill authorizes $325 million annually for each of fiscal years 2023 through 2027 for the US State Department to counter the influence of the CCP, the Government of China, and entities acting on their behalf globally. For purposes of this bill, “malign influence” means acts conducted by the CCP or the Government of China, or entities acting on their behalf, that “(1) undermine a free and open international order; (2) advance an alternative, repressive international order that bolsters the [CCP]” or the Chinese Government’s “hegemonic ambitions and is characterized by coercion and dependency”; or (3) threaten the national security, economic security, or sovereignty of the United States or other countries.
The Science and Technology Agreement Enhanced Congressional Notification Act of 2023
The House passed the Science and Technology Agreement Enhanced Congressional Notification Act of 2023 by voice vote. The bill requires the US State Department to notify Congress at least 15 days before entering, renewing, or extending any science and technology agreement with the Government of China or an entity of China. The notification must include the full text of the agreement, including annexes or side letters, as well as:
- A detailed justification of why the agreement is in the United States’ national interest;
- An “assessment of any risks posed by such agreement, and the checks it includes to prevent the transfer of technology” or IP capable of harming the United States’ national security interests or enabling China’s “military-civil fusion strategy”;
- An “explanation for how the” State Department “intends to build in human rights protections for any scientific and technology collaboration conducted under such agreement” and an assessment of how it “will be able to prescribe terms for, and continuously monitor, the commitments and contracts made by” by the Government of China or an entity of China under the agreement; and
- A “summary of changes or updates to the agreement that were secured to strengthen the United States[’] ability to engage in science cooperation with . . . China in a way that is safer” and “more beneficial for the United States, or allows for stronger United States oversight over joint research.”
The other China-related bills passed by the House may be found on the Select Committee on the CCP’s website.
TAKEAWAY
The wide range of and largely strong bipartisan support of this legislation indicate that Congress remains very interested in US-China competition. In 2025, with both a new Congress and a new Administration, this will remain the case.
1 Press Release, CHINA WEEK UPDATE: Congress Takes on the Chinese Communist Party, Select Committee on the CCP (Sept. 10, 2024).
3 This determination would include any subsidiary, parent, affiliate, or successor of the entity.